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Abstract: This article explores the dependencies between the European Union 
and its eastern member states and Russia. The EU -27 and Moscow formulate their 
energy security target -systems following two considerably different strategic en-
ergy approaches. The parties might initially appear to be interdependent in the 
examined ﬁ eld. This view, however, would only have relevance if the energy policies 
of the European Union were uniﬁ ed and regulated at Union level, and this is not 
the case. Hence it is a more substantive question to ask what relationships separate 
member states maintain with Russia concerning gas affairs. The second half of this 
article concerns itself with an in -depth analysis of the central -eastern European 
member states of the European Union. It demonstrates, on the basis of historical 
and geographical factors and recent discussions regarding gas and gas lines, that 
the interdependence of countries in the eastern part of the Union and Moscow 
is asymmetric. Accompanying risks are even more severe, since the two regions, 
central -eastern Europe and Russia, are separated from each other by so -called 
gatekeeper countries.
Keywords: energy policy, security policy, supply security, European Union, 
Russia
Introduction
Energetics is an idiosyncratic frontier between politics and economics. In this era 
of economic globalization, the long -term target systems and strategies of interna-
tional and corporate spheres should be formulated considering speciﬁ c environmen-
tal impacts. Since the end of the 20th century, the spatial integration of markets and 
the convergence of operational regulations and their institutions have been taken as 
an empirical fact. Although changes primarily take place in the economic world, 
global and local politics play an important role in their motivation, coordination 
and restriction at all times.
In the case of the energy market the emphasis of state activity is laid on en-
ergy security. Present crises in the extractive and transit countries, unusual and 
unpredictable natural relationships, unequal geographical distribution of hydro-
carbons, dropping reserves, rising energy prices and the increasing demand for 
energy as a result of economic growth also contribute to the players of world 
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politics formulating new energy policy, and accordingly creating new targets and 
strategies.
Economic and market players are also interested in sustaining energy security, 
since both the economic competitiveness of society and domestic welfare strongly 
depend on the security of energy supply. This is particularly true for the hydrocar-
bons market, since retail customers’ propensity to pay for this product is proven 
to be high1. According to László Varró several signs show that“ the social value of 
energy -supply security is rising with economic development” (Varró, 2007: 64.). 
Therefore potential problems of energy supply may have a strong impact on eco-
nomic development. This is particularly true for the service sector (commerce, 
banking, tourism), where temporary or permanent energy failure might result in 
lasting loss of consumer conﬁ dence.
Although it seemed that after the termination of the bipolar world system energy 
gradually became the topic of traditional economic policy instead of security policy 
or security strategy, the situation observed in the Cold War era has not substantially 
changed in the 21st century. There is no sign that this strategically managed ﬁ eld 
has come completely under the inﬂ uence of market mechanisms, despite that fact 
that economic sciences primarily, and in many cases exclusively, deal with analyz-
ing energy policy using their own narratives. This perspective, however, does not 
account for the direct and indirect military dimensions of hydrocarbons including 
natural gas, together with the strategic movement of players in the ﬁ elds of eco-
nomic policy and international politics. This only allows a limited, economically 
biased deﬁ nition of the term‘ energy security’. Hydrocarbons have become strategi-
cally important raw materials primarily due to their role in economic life; hence 
this is one of the reasons that their role in politics has also become strategically 
important2. So it can be argued that the energy security problem continues to be a 
determinant factor in the making of economic and security policy at the beginning 
of the new millennium.
This article examines the dependencies between the eastern part of the European 
Union and Russia. The ﬁ rst half discusses the energy policies of Brussels and Mos-
cow. In my opinion the importance of the topic is derived from the fact that the two 
economic and world political players formulate their energy security target system 
following two considerably different energy strategy concepts. Both approaches lay 
emphasis on the term‘ energy security’ with different foci.
The second half of the article analyzes the gas dependence of central -eastern 
European Union member states on Russia. An attempt is also made to analyze the 
1 See e.g. the results of a Hungarian Public Opinion Poll Institute (Tárki) – survey commissioned by 
the Hungarian Energy Bureau.
2 Not considering the military consequences.
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idiosyncratic gatekeeper role of countries that lie between central -eastern Europe 
and Russia – with special attention to Ukraine, in regard to security policy power-
-play and planned gas line projects.
Piped gas Line of Business as a special energetic ﬁ eld
Examining the problem of energy security in the case of natural gas, a great 
number of idiosyncrasies can be noticed that are exclusively characteristic to this 
energy resource. The natural gas market is one of the most dynamically growing 
branches of energy supply within fossil energy resources due to its competitive 
price and its widespread industrial and household consumption. It has an advantage 
compared to the other non -renewable energy sources in that it has relatively fewer 
environmentally polluting effects.“ The recently activated new generation Com-
bined Circle Gas Turbines (CCGT) produce energy with favourable contamination 
emissions and higher efﬁ ciency and economy compared to coal or oil -fuelled power 
plants” (Íjgyártó, 2006: 86.).
The value, usability, transportability and marketability of natural gas is different 
from that of crude oil in many ways. Therefore the gas Line of Business (LOB) and 
related policies are also substantially different. Its energy content is less than that of 
crude oil; however its delivery costs are higher3. The Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF) 
element appears more signiﬁ cantly in the case of natural gas. Its delivery in piped 
form is technologically complex and costly. Although certain pressure -ﬂ uctuation 
is acceptable in the pipelines, restoration of supply after service -failure is more dif-
ﬁ cult than in the case of electricity. Furthermore it has far fewer transit alternatives 
compared to crude oil; consequently gas trade is less secure. Natural gas is storable, 
however only in expensive facilities expressly established for this purpose.
Inter alia due to the above features4 it can be argued that the establishment of an 
effective market in the case of piped gas LOB is not simple. The required pipeline 
system is a“ natural monopoly, its duplication is not possible. Hence“ third party 
access” is a prerequisite for competition: the owner of the network makes it avail-
able for all market players as a public infrastructure at a non discriminative network 
tariff” (Varró, 2007: 68.).
The gas market is regional, therefore the price is determined on the basis of indi-
vidual agreements between extractors, suppliers and customers; the actual crude oil 
and Diesel -oil price in the region is rather informative. It is characterized by strong 
seasonal consumption; however, owing to its wide utilization, supply problems 
3 ”From the cost of delivering an energy unit in the form of natural gas from the North Sea to the 
European continent the same energy content in crude oil could be delivered twice around the 
world.” (ÍJGYÁRTÓ, 2006: 86.).
4 Primarily due to the required special infrastructure.
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immediately have an effect. As a result of high investment and operational costs it 
is worth operating the pipelines at full capacity5, so extractors are also interested in 
the ownership of the pipelines (UNEP–WORLD BANK, 2003; INTERNATIONAL ENERGY 
AGENCY, 1995).
Supply -oriented energy policy of the European Union (reasons, 
opportunities and limitations)
International, primarily western scholars in energy policy literature attempt to 
deﬁ ne energy strategy fundamentally considering the provision and security of sup-
plying a given economic or political region. Accordingly, the mission and objective 
of energy strategy is to sustain the continuity of energy supply with the help of dif-
ferent political and economic tools. Regions having limited or no energy resources, 
including hydrocarbon reserves, are particularly characterized by this strategy. The 
energy strategy of such importers is determined by forced long -run import6. This 
strategy in practice coincides with the energy policy of the European Union (EU).
The most important reason for supply -oriented energy policy is falling gas re-
serves in Europe. Furthermore the continent has to account for increasing natural 
gas demand.“ According to estimates the natural gas demand of European Union 
countries might reach 601 billion cubic metres by 2015, of which 195 billion cubic 
metres would be used in energy production” (ÍJGYÁRTÓ, 2006: 87.). This is primarily 
due to the fact that the role of natural gas within the energy sector has been escalat-
ing since Brussels set the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions as an objective. 
Although in the coming decades the highest dynamism is expected in the ﬁ eld of 
renewable energy sources (around 74 per cent growth between 2000 and 2030), 
gas -consumption is still placed second at 64 per cent, since the role of the latter 
within the energy -balance could increase from 16 to 32 per cent, thereby approach-
ing the role of oil falling from 40 to 35 per cent (LUDVIG, 2006: 151.).
Within the framework of supply -oriented energy policy, the EU has speciﬁ ed 
a number of objectives such as reducing energy -dependence, creating diversiﬁ ed 
energy -supply, achieving sustainable development though technological develop-
ments and increasing energy efﬁ ciency, together with inspiring regional solidarity 
and cohesion through formulating and implementing uniﬁ ed standards7. The latter 
is argued to be the greatest limitation to supply -oriented energy policy.
5 The unit cost doubles if a 51mm line operates in 50 per cent efﬁ ciency.
6 The strongest exception is the United States of America, who became a crude oil importer in the 
1950s, and had been crude oil exporter until 1948. In 1959 the American administration introduced 
a formal import quota system to protect its domestic crude oil extraction (Mikdashi et al., 1970).
7 More in -depth description can be found in the energy policy documents of the Union, speciﬁ -
cally in the Energy Charter and in the Green Books as of 2000 and 2006 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
2000A; 2000B; 2006).
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Regarding the defensive energy strategy of the Union, it is essential to brieﬂ y 
mention the documents and regulations providing the framework for EU -level natu-
ral gas policy. The ﬁ rst document is the so -called Energy Charter. It is the ﬁ rst ini-
tiative with the intended aim of summarizing the principals of European energetic 
cooperation. The Charter was signed in The Hague in December 19918, though 
at that time it could be regarded as a cooperation agreement; it became a legally 
binding international treaty after Russia signing in 1994, and came into effect in 
1998. The Charter was later added into the aquis communautaire.
The document was fundamentally aligned to World Trade Organization (WTO) 
standards. It aimed to remove discrimination in the ﬁ elds of investments, extraction, 
processing and delivery. It declared the principle of national or most favourable treat-
ment in the case of investments among the signatories, and laid warranties against 
nationalization and appropriation Furthermore it declared the right of investors to 
repatriate proﬁ t, and to select managers and employees (Romanova, 2002: 59.). The 
Charter also deals with transit deliveries together with infrastructural operation; 
accordingly it prescribes the creation of access to pipelines without discrimination 
for all the signing and third parties.
The fulﬁ lment of the actions laid out in the document has, however, come up 
against severe difﬁ culties, of which the most outstanding is that Russia has not 
ratiﬁ ed the contract. Its primary reason is that the range of incorporated countries 
was remarkably wide, hence“ the Russian supplier Gazprom did not intend to lose 
the political and economic weapon of providing access to the pipelines in favour of 
its competitors” (Ludvig 2006: 150.).
The Green Book 2000 and 2006 are fundamental documents in understanding the 
energy strategy of the European Union (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2000B; 2006). In the 
document issued in 2000 the Union considers available energy sources, anticipates 
acquisition and energy consumption tendencies by 2030, and faces the energy con-
sequences of growing demand. The aforementioned reasons for the supply oriented 
energy strategy of the EU are presented. Furthermore the document presents the key 
energy goals as follows: sustainability, competitiveness and provision of supply.
Prospects of Russian demand -oriented energy policy
The supply -oriented approach expresses just one side of the energy strategy. 
The geographically unequal distribution of energy resources prioritized in the era 
of Cold War, primarily hydrocarbons, resulted in a diversity of energy strategies. 
Hence for countries having large hydrocarbon reserves – likely exporters – the 
8 Apart from all the European Union member states the United States of America, Canada, Japan 
and Australia also signed the Charter.
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above strategy does not make sense. In this case the mission and objective of en-
ergy strategy is to provide the security of demand, and to use the income derived 
from supply -provision for different political and/or economic goals. Accordingly 
tools are not ordered to provide security of supply – instead income from provid-
ing energy supply (energy export) is rearranged to serve political and/or economic 
goals. However, these goals are not generally linked to the energy industry, but 
are mostly linked to economic or foreign policy. This concept clearly reveals the 
primary objective of Russian energy policy in the piped gas LOB.
What characterizes Russian gas policy at present? The answer can be found in the“ 
Energy Strategy of Russia to 2020” document. Although this strategy had already been 
formulated in 2000, it was only approved in 20039. The framework of the Russian en-
ergy strategy can be discerned from this document, and is well characterized by the 
earlier discussed term‘ demand oriented energy strategy’ in the ﬁ eld of gas LOB.
The essence of Russian demand -oriented energy policy can be unravelled from 
supply and demand sides. The continent -sized country possesses one third of the 
world's natural gas reserves. Furthermore, substantially expanding production ca-
pacity and increasing exports are expected.
The magnitude of exploitable reserves in 2005 came to 47.820 billion cubic me-
tres, from which the volume under extraction was 598 billion cubic metres (BRITISH 
PETROLEUM, 2006). This is expected to increase by 25–30 per cent by 2020 accord-
ing to the Russian energy strategy concept. Natural gas exports are expected to 
reach 275–280 billion cubic metres compared to the 185 billion cubic metres as 
of 2002 (MINISTRY OF ENERGY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 2003). Russia plans to 
expand its markets, which based on the fact that beyond Europe substantial demand 
is expected for natural gas in the Paciﬁ c -region and in south Asia.
Perceived tendencies in the demand and supply sides of gas LOB raise not only 
the opportunity for but also the barriers against Russia applying a more offensive 
energy strategy. Russia has to account for more dilemmas arising in its long -term 
energy policy, which seem to be multiplied by the world economic crisis. The 
ﬁ rst goal of implementing an offensive energy strategy is to provide the long -term 
demand for Russian natural gas10. Furthermore other factors also inﬂ uence the 
feasibility of a proactive energy policy: 1. When will Russian reserves deplete? 
2. Is Russia able to control its great natural gas reserves in the long run? 3. Is it 
able to control the majority of the gas line system? 4. Is it able to accomplish the 
necessary technological developments adequately (fundamentally without outside 
assistance)? 5. How will the global hydrocarbon price develop in the long -run?
9 Government resolution No. 1234 as of 28 August 2003.
10 Solvent, adequate size, predictable, available in the long -run, diversiﬁ ed.
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Stability in the Russian economy is based on the permanent hydrocarbon trade, 
namely gas exports. The share of budgetary income derived from the sale of en-
ergy resources is extraordinary high, which sets limits on establishing an offensive 
energy policy. Although the Russian energy strategy to 2020 attempted to double 
the annual natural gas export from the 185 billion cubic metre level as of 2003 
to 275–280 billion, export in recent years has decreased instead of increasing. It 
raises the question of what changes the deepening crisis might generate for Russian 
outlooks.
Russia might compensate for interruptions with price -increases or market ex-
tension. In the former case in internal markets – where for social and economic 
reasons gas was sold at extraordinarily low prices before the crisis – the Kremlin 
should expect serious public dissatisfaction. In western markets the prevailing 
price is ﬁ xed to a price formula laid out in long -term contracts, which is inter alia 
based on the prevailing Brent crude oil price. The situation is different and not 
positive from the viewpoint of Moscow, in countries within the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) where the parties have so far counted on depressed 
prices compared to global market prices. Changing pricing systems and price 
increases may lead to gas wars, supply problems, and, what is most severe for 
Russia, the failure of expected revenues (see inter alia the difﬁ culties derived 
from the receivables of Naftogas). This means that an offensive gas pricing policy 
within the Russian sphere of interest could easily generate the unsettlement of 
existing (western) markets.
Other anomalies can be discerned with respect to market expansion. The Russian 
energy strategy to 2020 does not resolve the discrepancy between the magnitude 
of investment requests and the Russian reservations against incorporating external 
funds, with regard to both existing markets and potential new buyers.
“ Among the greatest uncertainty factors of Russian hydrocarbon supply security 
are currently the weakness, the capacity and particularly the maintenance problems 
of delivery infrastructure” (Ludvig, 2006: 168.). Besides modernization and main-
tenance the modernization of research, extraction, gas production and processing 
becoming more and more costly also creates difﬁ culties for Russia.
Though the Russian energy strategy sets the diversiﬁ cation of hydrocarbon 
markets as an objective, thereby underpinning the sustainability of offensive eco-
nomic policy, effective implementation is not guaranteed, particularly in this era 
of economic crisis when the expected gas demands in the future cannot be easily 
predicted.
Prevailing price is also a central element of Russian energy strategy. As long as 
prices are high, state budget revenue will also be high. However, if prices dramati-
cally drop, and the situation seems to be durable, then Russia might become a raw 
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material projection of developed western and eastern countries from the viewpoint 
of energy policy.
Is dependence interdependence?
Based on the above, the relationship between the European Union and Russia is 
characterized by interdependence in the ﬁ eld of piped gas LOB, and is expected to 
remain so in the future. Hence the deputy Chief Executive Ofﬁ cer of Gazprom, Al-
exander Medvedev is correct when arguing that“ Europe depends on Russian gas, 
and likewise Russia depends on European gas procurement. This interdependence 
guarantees a strong commercial partnership and the long -term stability of supply” 
(CROOKS, Financial Times, 9 November 2007). The former German chancellor Ger-
hard Schröder expressed a similar viewpoint in his interview given to the Hungarian 
political journal Népszabadság in 2008.“ 70 per cent of Russian export is directed 
to Europe, whereas one quarter of Russian state revenue is derived from gas and oil 
selling. Russia depends on the customers and Europe on gas. This is interdepend-
ence” (GERGELY, Népszabadság Online, 12 April 2008).
These standpoints could possibly gain relevance if the energy policy of the Eu-
ropean Union in gas affairs were uniﬁ ed and energetics were regulated as a com-
munity level policy, or the member states at least followed similar strategies in this 
ﬁ eld, however this is not the case.
The Union has little latitude for manoeuvring, since energy policy is not regulated 
at Union level, i.e. the authorities of the Energy Committee have not enabled the 
implementation of a uniﬁ ed Union level energy policy. Consequently member states 
mostly politicize against one another and Brussels. Bilateral contracts are signed 
instead of community level agreements11. Since the Union cannot be regarded as 
uniﬁ ed in the ﬁ eld of energy policy, it cannot act in a uniﬁ ed and expedient man-
ner concerning its strategic goals. Hence in this sense it cannot be regarded as an 
independent entity, and so the above mentioned EU -Russian interdependence does 
not have substantive, practical support. Hence it is a more substantive question to 
ask what relationships separate member states maintain with Moscow concerning 
gas affairs.
The situation in central -eastern Europe
The markets of European countries on the two sides of the former‘ iron -curtain’ 
were considerably different from each other. While members of the former European 
11 The greatest example of this might be the German -Russian agreement in relation to the Nord 
Stream gas line, which had been a high priority Union programme; however, its planned trace 
displeasured more EU members and Brussels.
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Community (EC) are located between the gas -ﬁ elds of the North Sea and North Af-
rica and generally possess extensive coastlines, making them natural customers of 
Liqueﬁ ed Natural Gas (LNG) even today, the energy demand of former CMEA12 
countries has become even more exposed to Russian natural gas. The energy de-
pendence of eastern Europe on Russia (in particular considering natural gas) can be 
grounded not only in geographical but also in historical reasons.
The energy poverty of states in the former Soviet sphere of inﬂ uence represented 
one of the milestones of CMEA relationships. It was a determinant process between 
1958 and 1965 in the rapid integration of the satellite states of the Soviet Union into 
the aforementioned organization, which initially had the main goal of accomplish-
ing the economic -strategically key energy and raw material programme. It was in 
the interests of the Soviet Union“ to eliminate energy and raw material poverty 
hindering production growth derived from the earlier unplanned and dispropor-
tional development, and to fulﬁ l the energy and raw material requests necessary for 
smooth, planned growth” (Szakács, 2002: 233).
Estimations and plans were made between 1957 and 1958 to explore the demands 
within CMEA. The rearrangement of the energy structure by increasing crude oil 
and natural gas import to accomplish the DIP13 programme seemed to be inevitable. 
This was facilitated by the discovery of the enormous West Siberian crude oil and 
natural gas reserves at the end of the 1960s. Accordingly a number of large invest-
ments were made in the energy industry. The preparation and implementation of 
uniﬁ ed electricity, crude oil and natural gas systems were begun at that time14.
With the establishment of the system the central European CMEA countries be-
came the stable markets of Soviet hydrocarbon export. Moscow was able to predict-
ably calculate export volume, which was mostly dictated by its trading area. It was 
based on, ﬁ rstly, the Soviet -friendly leadership of these markets and secondly the 
establishment of the aforementioned hydrocarbon line system, which at the same 
time excluded the possibility of central -eastern European CMEA countries fulﬁ ll-
ing their energy demand from other sources.
Although in the beginning Moscow offered favourable hydrocarbon prices for 
CMEA members, in reality considerable discrimination was applied against these 
countries. Examining the period between 1955 and 1960 it emerges that the price of 
Russian crude oil exported to CMEA countries exceeded the export price applied for 
12 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. In was founded in 1949 as a counterpoint to the 
Marshall -plan and the European Economic Community. In the cold war it functioned as a con-
sultation organization of the eastern orbit and as a mediator organization of Soviet military and 
economic will.
13 DIP (dognat’ i pieriegnat’), i.e.“ reaching and exceeding”, which was assumed to be a vision and 
programme to implement the transformation to communism.
14 Inter alia the Hungarian section of“ Friendship” crude oil line was opened in October 1962.
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countries outside of the CMEA by an average of ﬁ fty per cent.“ While within CMEA, 
the average barrel price was 3.31 dollars, it was elsewhere 2.2 dollars” (The Seven 
Sisters, 1975: 362–364.).“ The oil price explosion had diametrically contrary effects 
on the terms of trade of the Soviet Union and the hydrocarbon importing European 
CMEA countries: while the Soviet Union as an exporter managed to effect signiﬁ -
cantly improving terms of trade, the importer CMEA countries experienced dramati-
cally worsening terms of trade in the 1970s” (Szemerkényi, 2007: 25.).
After the oil crisis in 1973 the hydrocarbon business directed towards the CMEA 
generated substantial budgetary overload, which can be explained by the“ hard 
currency price” of external, primarily western European markets. Accordingly the 
earlier CMEA target markets became transit countries assuring access to western 
markets. By the middle of the 1970s, in parallel with increasing western exports, 
decreasing Soviet energy deliveries were experienced in many countries in the So-
viet orbit (The Petroleum Economist, 1976).
The pipeline system was established to deliver Soviet gas west; hence the east-
-west directed pipeline system was built in the central European region, i.e. the 
Belarus -Poland -Germany, Ukraine -Slovakia -Austria/Czech Republic and Ukraine-
-Hungary lines. This infrastructure did not change signiﬁ cantly after changes to 
the central -eastern European political system. Dependence on Russian gas has 
remained the idiosyncrasy of the region.
This situation should make countries in the region realize that regional coopera-
tion is essential also in the ﬁ eld of energy policy. Accordingly the establishment and 
intensiﬁ cation of north -south cooperation may primarily help central -eastern EU 
members to increase energy security.
The European Union and Russia are in an interrelated relationship with each 
other concerning the piped gas LOB, however – primarily due to the fact that the 
energy policy of the EU is not implemented at Union level – the question cannot 
be neglected as to whether the relationship between the two economic and world 
political players is symmetric or asymmetric considering dependence in terms of a 
regional breakdown. For that purpose it is worthwhile to compare the gas depend-
ence of the former EU -15 and the central -eastern European countries that joined 
after 2004 on Russia.
It can be concluded that the two regions are signiﬁ cantly different from each other 
in terms of their gas dependence on Russia (Kaderják, 2008). This differentiated 
situation is analyzed in Table 1 which was assembled using the data of the British 
Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2008.
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Table 1a: Trade Movements in 2007 by Pipeline to EU
Western European exporters
From where Belgium Germany Netherlands Norway Great-Britain
To where bn m3 (%) bn m3 (%) bn m3 (%) bn m3 (%) bn m3 (%)
Austria 1,1 14,71 0,78 10,43
Belgium 1,6 8,27 7,1 36,71 9,5 49,12 0,64 3,31
Great-Britain 1,8 6,43 1,6 5,71 8,2 29,29 16,4 58,57
Finland
France 1,9 5,63 0,1 0,3 8,92 26,42 15,11 44,76 0,1 0,3
Greece
Netherlands 5,5 29,16 7 37,12 1,82 9,65
Ireland 4,15 100
Luxemburg 0,8 53,33 0,7 46,67
Germany 19,13 22,85 23,74 28,36 2,9 3,46













Total IMPORT 2,7 0,8 15,38 4,55 42,86 12,68 77,67 22,97 26,76 7,91
West IMPORT 2,7 0,93 12,45 4,29 42,86 14,78 75,47 26,03 26,76 9,23
East IMPORT 0 0 2,93 6,08 0 0 2,2 4,56 0 0
Note: Except for Estonia, Denmark, Malta and Cyprus
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North African exporters Total 
EXP.From where Algeria Libia
To where bn m3 (%) bn m3 (%) bn m3 (%) bn m3 (%) (%)
Austria 5,6 74,87 7,48
Belgium 0,5 2,59 19,34
Great-Britain 28
Finland 4,3 100 4,3
France 7,63 22,6 33,76
Greece 2,89 100 2,89
Netherlands 2,3 12,2 2,24 11,88 18,86
Ireland 4,15
Luxemburg 1,5
Germany 35,55 42,46 2,4 2,87 83,72
Italy 23,8 32,85 22,1 30,5 9,2 12,7 72,45
Portugal 1,39 100 1,39
Spain 8,8 80,37 10,95
Sweden 0,96 86,49 1,11
Bulgaria 3,1 100 3,1
Czech Republic 6,43 74,51 8,63
Poland 6,2 66,67 2,3 24,73 9,3
Latvia 1,6 100 1,6
Lithuania 3,4 100 3,4
Hungary 7,85 74,9 1,8 17,18 10,48
Romania 2,5 52,08 1 20,83 4,8
Slovakia 5,8 100 5,8
Slovenia 0,56 50,91 0,1 9,09 0,44 40 1,1
Total IMPORT 120,01 35,49 10,8 3,19 32,73 9,68 9,2 2,72 338,11
West IMPORT 82,57 28,48 5,6 1,93 32,29 11,14 9,2 3,17 289,9
East IMPORT 37,44 77,66 5,2 10,79 0,44 0,91 0 0 48,21
Note: Except for Estonia, Denmark, Malta and Cyprus
32
Is dependence really interdependence? 
Gas strategies seen from central -Eastern Europe Attila Virág
Table 1a, 1b summarizes the countries participating in European international 
piped gas trade15. Importer countries were divided into two groups. The ﬁ rst block 
contains former EU -15 countries in need of import. Their summary ﬁ gures can be 
found at the bottom of the table denoted by‘ West IMPORT’. The second block 
involves countries which have joined the EU since 200416. Exporters were divided 
into ﬁ ve categories: 1. western European exporters including Belgium, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Norway and Great -Britain, 2. Russia, 3. Turkmenistan, 4. other 
European and Eurasian exporters, and 5. ﬁ nally North African exporters.
The table clearly demonstrates the different trading areas of western and eastern 
importers. While the so -called western importers acquired 54.26 per cent of their 
natural gas demand from Western Europe, in particular from the ﬁ elds of the North 
Sea17, according to the data from July 2007, this rate in case of eastern importers 
hardly exceeds 10 per cent. Furthermore from the examined nine countries, only 
four has an import rate above 10 per cent18.
The situation is similar with North African sources. While the western countries 
acquire 14.31 per cent of their natural gas from here, the eastern countries acquire 
only 0.91 per cent. This value is attributable to one country, Slovenia, where 40 
per cent of its import comes from Algeria. However, it should be noted that only 
three Mediterranean countries of the former EU -15 are affected by such trade, but 
in high proportion (Italy imports 43.2 per cent, Spain 80.37 per cent and Portugal 
100 per cent from Algeria). Therefore the energy dependence on Russia cannot be 
practically interpreted as a problem in these countries; furthermore opening to the 
east might be useful from the viewpoint of diversiﬁ cation.
The situation is considerably different in the group of countries containing so-
-called eastern importers. Here 77.66 per cent of the imported natural gas arrives 
from Russia. This ratio in Western Europe is 28.48 per cent. From the examined 
nine eastern states, four fully depend on Russian gas (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Slovakia). Slovenia possesses the lowest dependency rate: 50.91 per cent, the 
others range between 52.08 and 74.9 per cent.
It can be therefore being concluded that the diverse features of geographical 
and historical endowments resulted in the formulation of different energy secu-
rity approaches, primarily in the area of diversiﬁ cation. The relating alternative 
perspectives can be clearly demonstrated by the struggle of establishing gas 
15 Except for Estonia.
16 Again except for Estonia.
17 There are altogether three countries which depend on Russian gas mostly or completely (Austria 
in 74.82 per cent, Finland and Greece completely.).
18 Czech Republic (25.49 per cent), Poland (8.6 per cent), Hungary (7.92 per cent), and Romania 
(27.08 per cent).
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lines in recent years. The Nabucco versus Nord/South Stream debate reﬂ ects 
the actual“ power relations” concerning the interdependence between the Union 
and Russia.
All three planned lines mostly affect countries in the eastern region of the Euro-
pean Union. It is worthwhile to separate these countries into two groups. The ﬁ rst 
group consists of central -eastern European member states which are affected both 
by Nabucco and/or South Stream lines: Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. 
The second group incorporates the North -eastern European Union members – Es-
tonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – affected by the implementation features of 
the Nord Stream line.
There is a common feature of the two regions, namely one -sided Russian en-
ergy dependence. From the countries in the ﬁ rst group, Bulgaria is 100 per cent 
dependent on Russian import, Austria 74.87 per cent and Hungary 74.9 per cent. 
The situation is comparable in the second group. Latvia and Lithuania completely 
depend on Russian gas, and two thirds of Polish natural gas imports are provided 
by Moscow.
The central -eastern European countries (ﬁ rst group) are ﬁ rmly interested in the 
diversiﬁ cation of their natural gas imports. The South Stream and Nabucco lines 
might also contribute to this, however not to the same extent. While the South 
Stream would facilitate route -diversiﬁ cation, Nabucco would also provide source-
-diversiﬁ cation in the case of its implementation. It should not be forgotten that there 
are some central -European EU member states which are left out of the projects, and 
accordingly their dependence on Russia is not mitigated19.
The South Stream and Nabucco
1. The Caspian -region and countries in the Middle -East, having large natural 
gas reserves, represent a high security policy risk for countries participating 
in the Nabucco project.
2. Russia does everything possible to block central Asian countries lest they 
should open to the old continent, bypassing Moscow.
3. Energy policy in the European Union is not regulated at Union level, which 
hinders and decelerates the uniﬁ ed action of member states in supply or secu-
rity issues. Union members often politicize against the interests of EU.
4. Russia – making use of the above situation – signs bilateral agreements with 
central and south -eastern European countries within the framework of the 
19 According to the current situation Romania only participates in the Nabucco project, and Slova-
kia, having 100 per cent Russian dependence, does not participate in either project, so neither gas 
line will go through the country.
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South Stream project, thereby currently having an advantage over the Union 
from the viewpoint of diversiﬁ cation20.
In the case of North -eastern European countries (second group) the situation is very 
similar – however, no competitive lines can be found here. The question is rather what 
route the planned line should follow to reach its destinations, and which countries 
might have access to Russian gas through transit fees and new infrastructure.
Participating and non -participating countries in the Nord Stream
1. The possibility of diversiﬁ cation from source -side is minimal in the North-
-eastern EU members. Primarily the allocation of a gas route from Russia 
may mitigate supply security risks.
2. Energy policy in the European Union is not regulated at Union level, which 
hinders and decelerates the uniﬁ ed action of member states in supply or secu-
rity issues. Union members often politicize against the interests of the EU.
3. Russia – making use of the above situation – signed a bilateral agreement 
with Germany within the framework of the Nord Stream project, thereby hav-
ing an advantage over the Union from the viewpoint of diversiﬁ cation21.
In summary it can be concluded that, although an interdependent relationship 
exists between the European Union and Russia in the ﬁ eld of the piped gas LOB, it 
can still be argued to be asymmetric in the eastern part of the Union.
Ukraine as the gatekeeper
The asymmetric gas dependence of the eastern part of the EU on Russia also 
encumbers the energy relationships of the region with Moscow in another way. 
A determinant element of this problem is that the two world political and economic 
players are separated from each other by so -called gatekeeper countries, such as 
Georgia, Turkey, Belarus and Ukraine. These countries cannot be avoided when 
considering European exports. Their locations may afford them serious economic 
and political leverage.
20 The South Stream project meets diversiﬁ cation goals from the viewpoint of routing, however, from 
the viewpoint of sources, countries in the region will depend on Russian gas to an even greater ex-
tent than today, and Moscow could more ﬁ rmly link countries in the Balkans and Central -Eastern 
Europe to itself.
21 Although Germany gains an advantage from the project, since it receives the gas directly from 
Russia, the currently planned variant of the Nord Stream line earlier supported by the Union may 
withdraw the transit fees and/or the opportunity for route -diversiﬁ cation from countries which 
have a one -sided dependence on Russia. Latvia, Lithuania and Finland acquire their gas imports 
from Russia exclusively. Two thirds of Polish natural gas imports are supplied by Moscow.
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The theory of transactional costs approaches this problem as follows:“ The man-
agement and coordination of transactions involving special capital assets (in this 
case piped gas -trade) cannot be committed to market automatisms due to their risk 
and accompanying uncertainty… The contract between the supplier and the cus-
tomer becomes much more complex compared to those on the competitive market, 
and requires protection against the opportunism of the other party” (Mátyás, 1996: 
620–621.). In this sense the supplier expects collateral from the customer to en-
sure that they do not terminate the contract before expiration, and do not misuse 
the dependence of the supplier on the customer. In the same way the customer 
expects from the supplier that they appropriately meet the contractual undertak-
ings. A great number of such requests are usually extended to the implementation 
phase of the contract, which is a special risk factor, in particular when the contract 
becomes unfeasible due to external circumstances. The best example of this is the 
Russian -Ukrainian gas debates of 2006 and 2009, which inspired both Brussels and 
Moscow to review their energy strategy in the case of the piped gas LOB, and to 
formulate tactical steps different from the accustomed ones.
Unfortunately the parties have not dealt with the problems underpinning the 
Russian -Ukrainian gas price debate of 2006 by attempting to avoid expected dis-
putes between Moscow and Kiev or resolving unexpected conﬂ icts, but instead 
have completely and literally by -passed the existing problem.
Western countries sharply and uniformly criticized the energy policy of the 
Kremlin in January 2006. The conﬂ ict endangering the security of European energy 
supply encouraged the USA and the European Union to consider new tactical steps. 
A large number of publications and studies in the United States concluded that 
Moscow engaged the energy -weapon within the framework of an offensive energy 
strategy (Wallander, 2006). The European Union was also shocked by the situation 
that emerged, which was demonstrated by support for Ukraine and acceptance of 
Kiev’s standpoint. This could also be explained by the proximity of the events of the 
Orange Revolution. Turning off the gas taps in 2006 was often interpreted as a Rus-
sian political reckoning against western -friendly forces. A good example of the es-
calating anti -Russian morale in the Union is the article by the leading analyst of the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Michael Emerson (Emerson, 2006).
Although the Green Book issued by the European Commission in March 2006 laid 
out the necessity of a“ new initiative” and the complexity of agreements between 
extractive and transit countries as opposed to bilateral and regional aggreements, 
few of the conceptions were implemented by the end of 2008. The primary goal, 
the implementation of a pan -European energy community including the neighbour-
hood of the European Union, is still being awaited.
As a response to the Russian -Ukrainian gas price debate, the EU put forward the 
necessity of further diversifying acquisition sources (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2006). 
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Though the second Green Book continues to describe Russia as the primary partner 
country concerning the gas LOB, in the case of source diversiﬁ cation it mentions 
examples from among Moscow’s competitors. Hence the document refers to North 
Africa, the Caspian -region and the Middle -East, and brings up the question of 
building up LNG terminals.
Reacting to the Russian -Ukrainian gas crisis at the turn of 2005/2006, the Eu-
ropean Union urged the implementation of the Nabucco line. The most important 
political goal of the project was to give Europe an alternative to Russian gas, and to 
make import routes more diversiﬁ ed.
Russia is interested in sustaining and increasing European demand. To reach that 
goal its energy policy has been constructed on three main strategic pillars. 1. Block-
ing other demand -oriented countries that are, like itself, attempting to open to the 
west. 2. Sustaining/achieving/restoring relationships with gatekeeper transit coun-
tries that are favourable to Russia. 3. Possible diversiﬁ cation of transit lines.
In the ﬁ rst case the approach of Russia is the following: control of the natu-
ral gas reserves and transit routes of central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which narrows the latitude of the Nabucco project 
from the source -side, and thereby strengthens the Russian position in the European 
natural gas market.
The second pillar seems to be rather complicated. Europe has more existing and 
optional gatekeepers from the Russian point of view (Belarus, Ukraine, Turkey and 
Georgia, to mention only the most signiﬁ cant ones). However, Ukraine is unique 
as the greatest part of the Russian transit passes through it, making it necessary to 
modify the Russian energy strategy after the turn of 2005/2006.
It does not seem to be simple for the two countries to manage their relationship, as 
both have political and economic backgrounds that have the potential to sustain con-
ﬂ ict. Russian and western -friendly forces have close to equal sway in Ukrainian interior 
policy. This makes the Ukrainian party system exceptionally unstable, which creates 
great risks not only for Russia, but also for Kiev and Brussels. The Russian -Ukrainian 
conﬂ ict at the turn of 2005/2006 has not been resolved and furthermore, it was inﬂ amed 
to a great extent in January 2009. The relationship is further burdened by the crisis in 
world economics shadowing the economic outlooks of both countries.
It can also be attributable to the worsening Russian -Ukrainian relationship that 
it has become an emphasized goal of Moscow to build a gas line system bypassing 
Kiev. This purpose could be served by the Nord, Blue or South Stream projects 
which have the aim of delivering natural gas to Europe while excluding Ukraine.
All in all it can be argued that neither the European Union nor Russia have at-
tempted to solve the problem (i.e. to pacify Ukraine as the gatekeeper country) in the 
past three years, but instead have strived for its exclusion, with limited success.
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Recurrent crises since 2005 culminating in 2009 showed what serious conse-
quences can arise when the gas pricing mechanism applied in the Union does not 
operate in Ukraine as a transit and at the same time gas consumption country. 
All -time high gas prices have been set as a result of political bargains between 
Russia and Ukraine. The situation was made even worse because the transactions 
were carried out through mediator organizations functioning amid non -transparent 
ownership.
Considering the fact that 80–85 per cent of Russian gas exports reach Europe 
through Ukraine, this central -eastern European country is an unavoidable factor 
in the gas imports of the Union. Although the agreement signed on 19th January 
2009 seems to resolve both problems, according to which the parties convert to a 
quarterly accounting system similar to that of Union members, and the mediator 
role of RosUkrEnergo is terminated in gas trade, the debate still does not seem to be 
over, since the parties may have signed an agreement which substantially overloads 
the Ukrainian budget and economy already being in a bad state. It is anticipated that 
January 2009 was not the last chapter of Russian -Ukrainian gas debate.
Conclusion
The gas crisis in January 2009 has revealed that the role of natural gas is of the 
utmost importance not only economically, but also politically. Accordingly, main-
taining and increasing energy security have to be key ﬁ elds of political strategy 
formulation. Examining the problem of natural gas, some idiosyncrasies might be 
uncovered as a consequence of which it can be concluded that the establishment 
of an effective market in the piped gas LOB is not a simple challenge. Due to the 
regional features of the market the all -time price is determined on the basis of 
individual agreements between extractors, suppliers and customers, which have not 
only business, but also political foundations.
The European Union and Russia – primarily due to their different endowments – 
formulate their energy security target system following two considerably different 
energy strategic approaches. The mission and objective of the former is to provide 
continuity of energy supply with the help of different political and economic tools, 
and that of the latter is to fulﬁ l the demand, and to use the income from supply 
provision to realize different political and/or economic goals.
On the basis of these contradicting and supplementary goals it could be argued that 
the relationship between the European Union and Russia can be characterized by 
interdependence on the piped gas LOB. However, this viewpoint does not consider 
the fact that the Union has little room to manoeuvre, since its energy policy is not 
regulated at a community level, i.e. the authorities of the Energy Committee do not 
enable the implementation of a uniﬁ ed Union -level energy policy. It is reasonable 
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to analyze the relationship of the two entities, however a relevant picture can only 
be gained about the relationship between the two world political and economic 
players if the positions of the parties in the given ﬁ eld (in this case energy policy) 
are well distinguishable, and this is not the case.
Hence Moscow can take a convenient position. Since the Union does not have a 
signiﬁ cant negotiator in this ﬁ eld, Russia can insist on the interdependence between 
the two parties, and at the same time gain positions in the European markets by 
signing bilateral contracts. The Union assists and acquiesces to it, arguing that the 
community is so strong and uniﬁ ed that negotiations are held with Moscow on 
mutual terms.
This may disguise the substantive question: what relationships do separate mem-
ber states keep with Moscow concerning gas affairs? The article has shown that 
the problem is twofold. On the one hand the eastern members of the European 
Union depend on Russia in an asymmetric way for several historical and geographi-
cal reasons, which are not substantially modiﬁ ed by the line projects currently in 
preparation phase. On the other hand the already overloaded relationship is fur-
ther encumbered by the fact that the two world political and economic players are 
separated from each other by so called gatekeeper countries like Georgia, Turkey, 
Belarus and Ukraine. These countries cannot be avoided when considering Euro-
pean import, as their locations may give them the potential for serious economic 
and political leverage.
The situation is made even more complicated in that these countries frankly can-
not be regarded as bastions of democracy. Conﬁ dent relationships essential in the 
gas LOB are further burdened by the world -wide impact of the economic crisis, 
which may limit the free gas ﬂ ow between extractors and customers not only due 
to extortive inﬂ uences, but also owing to economic constraints, since emerging or 
incumbent gatekeepers might spontaneously counteract.
Neither the European Union nor Russia have attempted to solve the latter problem 
(i.e. to pacify Ukraine as a gatekeeper country) between 2006 and 2009, but have 
instead strived for its exclusion, with limited success.
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